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INVENTIVE activity is limited in the following discussion to action con-
cerned with technical inventions, yielding new products to be turned
out and new devices to be used in economic production. We thus
exclude social inventions, new methods of inducing human beings to
compete and cooperate in the social progress—ranging from systems
of pay and incentives or arrangements of work sequence within a
firm to such far-reaching legal inventions as the modern corporation
or the planning system of an authoritarian economy. The effects of
social inventions on economic productivity are obviously major and
profound, but the occupational groups connected with social inven-
tions and the institutional arrangements for their production, selec-
tion, and application are so different from those involved with techni-
cal inventions that the two can hardly be treated together. And it
need scarcely be mentioned that we also exclude creative work of an
esthetic character, in which economic use is not the major aim or test.
Of the several characteristics usually formulated in defining tech-
nical inventions, the first discussed here is that an invention is a new
combination of available knowledge concerning properties of the
material universe. Two questions immediately arise. First, must the
combination be new? Second, must it be of already known properties
and processes without containing new discoveries?
The requirement of newness serves, presumably, to eliminate dupli-
cation in measuring the output of inventive activity, for clearly two
inventions identical in character do not represent two distinct addi-
tions to the stock of technological knowledge. But if we are concerned
with the input of inventive activity, if two identical inventions have
been made independently of each other, and if we measure the pro-
ductive factor involved by the capacity to produce inventions, then
these two inventions signify a greater input of inventive activity and
hence, all other conditions being equal, a greater supply of inventive
NOTE: I am indebted to Jacob Schmookler for helpful comments on an earlier version
of this paper.
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capacity than one invention. Furthermore, the supply of inventive
capacity involved is not necessarily smaller than that represented by
two independent and different inventions. It follows that an interest
in the input of inventive capacity and a technological measure of inven-
tive activity would require that an invention be defined as an independ-
ently derived rather than a new device; whereas an interest in the
output of inventive activity as a contribution to technological knowl-
edge would require that an invention be a new device, in the sense of
constituting a real addition to the stock of available knowledge.
Paradoxically, this may mean that a "borrowed" (to use a polite
adjective) invention may be new, and an independent invention may
be unborn if it has not yet become widely known. Inventions as a
measure of input of inventive activity may thus differ from inventions
as a measure of additions to the stock of knowledge both because of
duplication of independent inventions and because of what might be
called unknown or still-born cases.
The requirement that an invention be a combination of available
and existing knowledge concerning properties of the material universe,
with the implicit distinction between invention and discovery, has been
criticized—partly because of the difficulty of drawing the distinction.
More importantly, in that contrast, discovery is viewed as a process of
unveiling something already existing, implying an indefensible theory
of scientific knowledge. To be sure, much scientific work is devoted to
discovering testable properties of the physical universe—assembling
valuable information on coast lines, melting and boiling points, and
so on. And yet it must be recognized that scientists in "discovering"
their theories are in fact "inventing" them—for clearly the order
which they bring into the structure of the universe is of their own
contriving even though the test lies in an agreement between theoretical
conclusions and observational data mirroring the real world. We
may also admit that some scientific discoveries permit easy applica-
tion without further invention and that many inventions involve, or
quickly bring about, discovery of additional properties of the material
universe; hence the distinction between these areas is far from sharp.
Nor do we, in this analysis, have to accept patentability as the basis
of the distinction, although it does reflect significant differences be-
tween technical inventions and scientific discovery.
Despite these difficulties it seems to me that the distinction should be
retained for several important reasons. First, no problem of practi-
cality or usefulness arises in scientific discovery. Any scientific finding
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—whether it is specific information about the atomic weight of some
organic compound or a wide-flung theory of nuclear structure, whether
it is an accurate description of the coast line of the Persian Gulf or the
most speculative theory of geological formation—is potentially useful,
since any addition to our tested knowledge of the material universe is
exploitable in economic production (the latter being a reshuffling of the
material universe to make it better serve human purposes). Second,
most scientific discoveries are immediately useless—certainly so far
as the scientist is concerned, for he is not attempting the application of
the results to useful ends even if he is aware of them, which often he is
not. Third, the occupational groups, the institutional arrangements,
and the individual motivations of inventors are quite different from
those of scientists. Finally, since scientific discovery is usually general
in character, each discovery provides a base for a wide variety of
potential practical uses—technical inventions among them (the main
reason for nonpatentability). At least since the second half of the
nineteenth century, there have been many more scientific discoveries
than inventions that could have been based upon them, and the lags
between scientific discoveries and consequent inventions have been
numerous. Conversely, there have been many inventions based on
properties of the material universe, the knowledge of which has not
been fully incorporated into the corpus of scientific theory. These lags
and leads are indications that the two types of addition to knowledge
have distinctly different properties. For more effective organization
of the field of inquiry and sharper focusing of research, it would seem
to me better to keep the line of distinction and restrict the definition
of technical inventions to new combinations of existing knowledge
designed for practical use in production—even at the danger of over-
looking the contribution to knowledge that much inventive activity
may supply.
A second characteristic claimed for a technical invention is that
it must be the product of a mental effort above the average—although
we do not insist on a flash of genius or any other presumably rare
manifestation of man the contriver. The aim here is to distinguish
between inventions and the host of improvements in technique that
are made in the daily process of production and are the result of low-
level and rather obvious attentiveness or know-how. Not that the
cumulative effect of such obvious improvements on economic pro-
ductivity is slight. It is merely that an invention is supposed to be of
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some minimum magnitude—magnitude not of economic impact but
of input of some uncommon mental capacity of human beings.
Disregarding for the present the importance of this characteristic
in connection with patent legislation or any other system of rewards,
we may ask why the distinction between inventions and improvements
is attempted. If we could measure the economic magnitude of each
item from the most obvious improvement to the most majo.r invention,
would we still be interested in the distinction? The answer is "yes,"
if we assume that the upper segment of this range, i.e., the inventions
which in fact provide the basis for the improvements, can only be
produced by people with unusual equipment, and hence distinguishing
them would lead to a more fruitful examination of the type of effort
and corresponding type of personality involved. In particular, the
distinction suggests that while inventions and improvements may be
graded by their economic magnitude, no such continuity exists in the
range of human ability involved; that there are qualitative differences
between the effort and capacity associated with inventions and those
associated with obvious improvements, so that no shift from the one
to the other can be attained, no matter how much training, education,
or other use of reproducible resources is thrown into the scale. The
characteristic thus emphasizes the input side of inventive activity
and implies that the distinctive factor can be identified and studied.
Whether this is a valid assumption, whether an effective line can be
drawn between the capacity to produce inventions and that to make
obvious improvements, and whether the particular type of ability
connected with the former can be identified and studied, are questions
best left to other papers in the conference. But it clearly affects the
problem of measurement, and we shall return to it in the next section.
A third characteristic of a technical invention that may be suggested
is that it be useful, i.e., that it be a practicable device which, when
employed, would either reduce the cost of producing already estab-
lished goods or make possible the production of new goods for which
the demand is sufficient to cover costs. The reason for suggesting this
characteristic is obvious enough, particularly to economists: we are
interested in inventions because and insofar as they contribute to the
growth of economic production. Yet one can easily envisage inventions
that do not. For example, a new device for producing hairpins which
is more costly—now and in the foreseeable future—than the presently
used devices, is not useful in the sense in which we employ this term.
The difficulty with this criterion—and it has not been used in patent
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practice for some time—is that it requires knowledge concerning the
economic effects of an invention after it has gone through a period
of adaptation in pilot operation, and after an attempt has been made
to apply it on an adequate scale to test its market potentialities. Many
inventions never reach this stage; and practically all inventions when
they are completed and even when they are recorded, are still far from
the test of usefulness. To be sure, a patented invention must "work,"
i.e., the device must perform the task that the inventor claims for it;
and the same test must be applied when unpatented inventions are
recorded. But technical feasibility is a far cry from economic useful-
ness; and no assurance of the latter can be given at the time the inven-
tion is made. We must, therefore, shift the formulation to potential
usefulness, although the question then arises as to whose judgment is
to be accepted. The least demanding criterion would rely on the
judgment of the inventor himself or of the firm under whose auspices
he may be working. This standard does not provide a very firm base
for identifying usefulness; but it at least permits an inclusive definition
of inventions, on the assumption that they would not be made unless
each inventor believed that his device was potentially useful in
economic production.
But isthis assumption valid? Are inventions made with this
criterion clearly in mind? Or are many of them made out of sheer love
of tinkering, pride of authorship, or instinct of contrivance without
any regard to their potential usefulness in economic production? If
the latter were the case there would be a vast disparity between the
input of inventive activity and the output of potentially useful inven-
tions, for there would be a vast number of inventions not designed for
economic production. The disparity is large enough when we accept
as the test of potential usefulness the judgment of the inventor or his
firm; it would be enormous indeed if a great deal of inventive activity
were not economically oriented. One may ask whether we should per-
haps completely disregard the criterion of even potential usefulness
and define an invention as any new device, employable in economic
production, that represents some minimum mental effort. Yet, even
if we did so, we would still have to make some assumptions as to the
bearing of inventions on decreasing costs or on creating new products
in the economy. Moreover, if we disregarded the criterion of useful-
ness we would be in fact removing an important part of invention as
activity and as input. For it may be of the essence of invention that the
search is not merely for a new device—which may be relatively easy—
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but for a device that is more economical or attractively novel than
existing ones. This is the major difficulty involved in inventing, the
very aspect that may require that minimum effort discussed as the
second characteristic. And while some inventive activity may be mere
tinkering, and the potential usefulness of many inventions may be
exaggerated, I would strongly urge that the criterion of usefulness be
retained as a constituent characteristic in the definition of a technical
invention; that a distinction be made at least implicitly between
economically oriented inventive activity and noneconomically ori-
ented tinkering; and that some attention be devoted to the different
lewis of judgment of potential usefulness in the analysis of both
inventive activity and inventions. For this whole matter of usefulness
has, to my view, obvious bearing upon a variety of questions con-
cerned with measurement.
The Magnitude of an Invention
The preceding section led to a definition of inventive activity as being
concerned with technical inventions, i.e. new combinations of existing
knowledge in devices potentially useful in economic production and
resulting from a mental performance above the average. The difficul-
ties in measuring an activity so defined are perhaps obvious enough;
but before we review the available indexes, it may be well to discuss
explicitly the problems of measurement by dealing with the magnitude
of a single invention.
It follows from the earlier comments that an invention has a tech-
nical and an economic side; and, of course, it has a past and a future.
The combination of these two sets of aspects gives us four views of the
magnitude of an invention: (1) the technical problem overcome—
a view of the technical past; (2) the technical potential, i.e. the effect
of the invention on further technical changes and the progress of
technology in general—a view of the technical future; (3) the econo-
mic cost, i.e. the resources consumed or foregone in the "production"
of the invention—a view of the economic past; and (4) the economic
potential, i.e. the contribution of the invention to cost reduction or
to the production of new goods in the economy—a view of the econo-
mic future. If we could set down meaningful figures for each invention
under each of the four heads, the problem of measuring the input and
output of inventive activity would be almost entirely removed, for any
remaining difficulty of identifying inventions could be minimized. As
an economist I would be willing to settle for meaningful quantities
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under (3) and (4). But knowing that no easy answers are available, I
feel compelled to retain (1) and (2), for whatever help the examination
of the technical problems and potentials of an invention may give us
in considering its economic cost and contribution.
1. Consideration of the technical problem solved by an invention
brings us right back to invention as the product of human performance
of more than average quality. The difficulty is obviously related to the
existing stock of knowledge; and it is assumed that such knowledge
is accessible and that its possession is a necessary but not, in itself,
sufficient condition of an invention. Given the search for an economic-
ally useful device as part of the task, the other condition is the ability
to use the knowledge in some new and effective combination.
While a mere economist must tread warily here, it does seem to me
that the magnitudes of the technical difficulties resolved by various
inventions differ and, in that sense, different inventions represent
different magnitudes of inventive capacity and of its input. To illus-
trate: Kay's flying shuttle, a useful modification in the handloom,
represented the solution of a lesser technical problem than Ark-
wright's water-frame which mechanized spinning; Watt's separate
condenser solved a greater technical problem than the earlier im-
provements in Newcomen's engine; and to use a modern example,
the invention of an effective engine using nuclear power for air travel
would represent the solution of a greater technical problem than the
invention of another and better mechanical pen.
These are of course selected examples; a comparison of the technical
problems resolved by Watt's inventions relating to the steam engine
and Faraday's and his successors' on the electric generator would not
yield unequivocal answers. All I am arguing is that above the threshold
where obvious improvements cease ançl inventions begin the magni-
tudes of the technical problems resolved by inventions differ widely.
Some of the problems are difficult and major because they are con-
cerned with harnessing a new and previously intractable source of
power; others, because they involve the conversion of a vast, complex,
and time-consuming set of hand operations to machine operation;
still others, because they are concerned with the displacement of a
widely used but exhaustible material by a new one whose qualities,
other than a suitability for various purposes, are still not well known.
By contrast, the technical problems in other inventions seem to be of
smaller magnitude, because they are modifications within the existing
framework of technology and do not involve such new "large"
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elements as power, materials, or a complex set of manual operations.
Granted such differences between major and minor technical prob-
lems, I would argue next that the resulting major and minOr inventions
represent different levels of inventive activity. The only other explana-
tion would be the gradualist and additive theory of inventions in which
a major invention is the result of the long cumulative addition of small
increments with the final inventor getting the credit; a minor invention
is the sum of a shorter cumulative series. Inventions and inventors do,
o.f course, depend upon the cumulation of knowledge—scientific dis-
covery, past invention and improvements, and the state of the arts—
but this dependence does not deny the proposition that specific in-
ventive capacities vary, with the corollary that the difference between
major and minor technical difficulties resolved by invention often
represents different degrees of ability on the part of inventors. But as
indicated in my earlier comments, I claim no knowledge of this sub-
ject which is quite fundamental in the whole problem of the supply of
inventive capacity. It will, I hope, be dealt with by others. For the
present I shall assume that the magnitude of an invention as repre-
sented by the technical problem resolved is correlated with the capacity
of the inventive activity responsible.
2. Some inventions, representing as they do a breakthrough in a
major field, have a wide technical potential in the sense that they pro-
vide a base for numerous subsequent technical changes. In this respect
the invention of the first steam engine, which initiated a whole series
of major technical changes and applications—what might be called
subsidiary inventions—is vastly different from the invention of the
safety match or the pocket lighter. This wide range is for our purposes
the major characteristic relevant to the problem of measurement.
There is some positive correlation between the magnitude of the
technical problem resolved by an invention and the magnitude of its
technical potential. If an invention introduces a new industrial material
of potentially wide use, or harnesses a new source of power, or mechan-
izes a wide variety of previously labor consuming operations, the very
magnitude of the problem may mean that the first and pioneering
invention has not overcome the difficulty fully, that much remains to
be done by future inventions, and that the technical potential thus
opened up is wide. But this association cannot be fully relied upon. A
highly ingenious new device which overcomes a difficult technical
problem may not provide a base for many further technical changes;
while another invention that does not require comparable ingenuity
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in overcoming a difficult technical problem may become a base for
major subsequent changes in the technique of the process. I may be
wrong in thinking that the Bessemer converter, measured by the mag-
nitude of the technical problem resolved, was a "greater" invention
than the open-hearth furnace; yet it was the latter and not the former
that became the basis of modern steel technology, a foundation upon
which a long series of technical improvements and changes has been
built.
3. The economic cost of an invention can presumably be measured
by the value of the resources used in producing it—the time of the
inventor and his collaborators and the materials consumed, valued in
terms of alternative uses or market prices.
Three questions are immediately suggested by this formulation.
First, if n inventors are working on invention Xand one is successful,
we should presumably include the resources used by all n inventors,
not just by the one successful. This creates no problem if the cost of a
stream of inventions over a long period is to be measured since we
could presumably use the input of all would-be inventors, successful
and otherwise. But the specification of the cost of any single invention,
or of a limited group of them, calls for the capacity to identify all the
inventor inputs directed toward its attainment.
Second, how far back in the line of causation should we go in con-
sidering the cost? Should we include in the cost of an invention the
resources devoted to securing the knowledge, via scientific research
and discovery, that underlies it? Even if theoretically desirable, it
would be impossible to specify fully the antecedent knowledge em-
bodied in a given invention. But more important, if we treat inventive
activity like other production activity, there is no more reason to
charge it with the costs of scientific and other knowledge (except as
it is already reflected in the value of a trained inventor's time) than
there is to charge the production of any commodity—which is also
based on a wide stock of antecedent knowledge—with such costs.
Third, there is the problem of specifying the completion of an in-
vention and determining how farforward the cost calculation should be
carried. If we adhere to the definition followed here, an invention is
completed when it is shown to "work" and when a claim of possible
economic usefulness is made for it. Substantiation of this claim might
require a prolonged period of trial use and adaptation, a pilot opera-
tion, and sufficient mass application to permit most of the improve-
ments that make for economical production. The economic cost of a
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tested invention may, therefore, be a large multiple of the cost of an
untested invention; and it is important to distinguish between the two.
Since many inventions are never fully applied and tested, it is only
the economic cost of untested inventions that can be calculated for the
whole universe of inventions; and it is the economic cost of untested
inventions that corresponds to our definition of inventive activity.
But it is useful to keep in mind the additional development costs in-
volved in those inventions selected for and service as
innovations in productive activity.
4. The gross economic value of an invention to the inventor or the
private user is either the capital sum received for it or the capitalized
value of the returns that may be assigned to it. Such assignment and
capitalization may call for complicated and imprecise procedures,
but we are more concerned here with the economic contribution to
society.'
If an invention involves an increase in productivity in turning out
established goods, the gross magnitude of its economic contribution
to society is the discounted value of the additional yield that it will
permit. Given the data on such additional yield, its proper evaluation
requires, however, either knowledge of or assumptions concerning the
price elasticites of demand and supply.2 If an invention involves a new
product, a rough approximation to its economic magnitude seems to
me to be possible only if the new product can be treated as a substitute
for an old so that it again becomes feasible to estimate the additional
yield and seek for a defensible economic basis for evaluating it.
Granted the difficulties of the type of approximation just noted,
two further observations can be made. First, the estimate involves a
forecast, the weight of which is greater the longer the future of an in-
vention relative to its past (the future within the limits set by the
discounting rate). With a large proportion of inventions made never
reaching the development stage, the estimate of their gross economic
contribution is purely a forecast; and that of their net contribution is
1Itmay be of interest to note that in estimating the returns from research and develop-
ment expenditures the prevailing practices of firms follow rather rough and ready
formulas, utilizing arbitrary percentages of sales or returns, arbitrary time periods over
which to credit the invention or improvement with the effects, and perhaps no less
arbitrary estimates of the probability of success (see, e.g., Science and Engineering in
American Industry: Final Report on a 1953—54 Survey,NationalScience Foundation,
56—16, Washington, 1956,pp.49—52).
2 Seethe ingenious analysis for the cases of hybrid corn and related innovations in the
paper by Zvi Griliches, "Research Costs and Social Returns: Hybrid Corn and Related
Innovations," Journal of Political Economy, October 1958, pp. 419—431.
28PROBLEMS OF DEFINITION AND MEASUREMENT
a double forecast, involving as it must some approximation to develop-
ment costs still tosustained. Even for inventions that have been
selected for application as innovations, the estimate of the gross econo-
mic contribution to society is, within the limits set by the discount
rate, necessarily a projection that has to embody numerous assump-
tions concerning future effects on production and the future behavior
of market responses.
Second, if the invention is applied, itis likely to become the vehicle
of a host of obvious and minor improvements (perhaps more so in the
early phases than in the later) whose cumulative impact in reducing
costs will be large indeed. Should we credit the original invention with
all these improvements (denying credit to the latter) when assessing
its economic contribution? The question has even wider ramifications.
An invention introduced into a given industrial operation may not
only give rise to improvements in that operation, but may also stimu-
late greater productivity elsewhere. For example, the standardization
of cotton thread attained by the mechanization of spinning permitted
some minor improvements in weaving (even before its mechanization)
which would not have been possible with handspun thread. Should
we credit the improvement in weaving to the invention of a mechanical
spinning device?
An unequivocal answer is not easy. Although many inventions do
provide bases for a host of obvious and minor improvements which
otherwise could not have been made, it does not seem defensible to
credit an invention with savings realized at times and places often
remote from the original invention and inventor. The defensible an-
swer, difficult as it might be to apply in practice, would be that the
acceleration in the rate of minor improvements—over and above the
usual run of obvious improvements in production processes—should
be credited to the invention; and if we distinguish primary inventions
from auxiliary inventions connected with them, it may be more justi-
fiable to measure the economic contribution of a whole complex of
related inventions. In that case the economic contribution would be
measured by additions to output attained by the whole complex,
including the higher rate (higher compared with industries unaffected
by the new complexes) of obvious and minor improvements. The
difficulties we would encounter if we used such a definition of economic
contribution need not be emphasized. And yet in any rational calcula-
tion of economic returns from an invention some estimate of the
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contribution of the accelerated rate of minor improvements should
obviously be taken into account—minor improvements in the process
or product itself, from the standpoint of the firm; and both these and
an accelerated rate of minor improvements elsewhere from the stand-
point of society as a whole.
Several conclusions which emerge from this all too sketchy discus-
sion of the magnitude of an invention seem particularly relevant to
the problem of measurement.
First, inventions differ widely with respect to the magnitude of
technical problem overcome, technical potential, and economic con-
tribution. Untested inventions may differ widely with respect to econo-
mic cost and tested inventions surely differ widely with respect to their
development costs.
Second, the magnitude of technical problems overcome may be posi-
tively correlated with the technical potential of an invention and the
latter with its economic contribution. We may, therefore, assume,
although none too securely, a positive association between the magni-
tude of technical problems overcome and the economic contribution
of an invention.
Third, there is no reason to assume significant association between
the economic cost to the inventor of a single untested invention and its
potential economic contribution. However, some relation can be
assumed if we assign to a given invention, or a related group of them,
the total cost, including that of unsuccessful attempts. For if a given
area seems to a wide group of inventors to be potentially profitable,
the costs devoted to that area would be larger than those expended
elsewhere and if the judgment is correct, economic costs of inventions
would be large in areas where their potential economic contribution
is large. This, of course, assumes free market operation in the match-
ing of costs and potential returns and disregarding the effects of
government subsidies, etc. And if we include development costs, there
is more reason to expect that the cost of tested inventions would
be positively associated with the potential economic contribution, for
presumably—again on the assumption of free operation of market
forces—the greater resources needed for development would flow in
directions that seem most promising from the standpoint of potential
economic contribution—as judged by the criteria of the given firm,
although not necessarily by the criteria of social usefulness.
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Measures of Input
The difficulties in the measurement of input are those involved in
identifying the input and in evaluating it.
The major questions of identification may be stated as follows. Does
the effective prosecution of inventive activity depend upon a certain
relatively rare capacity of the human mind for which there is no
possible substitute in the combined efforts of several less gifted indi-
viduals? Or is inventive ability widely distributed, even if at different
levels, so that the body of potential inventors is limited only by the
size of the adult population and the resources available for its educa-
tion and by the time and facilities needed for effective inventing? Is
there quantitative comparability in inventive capacity, i.e., can one
man-hour of labor by a person at the x level of ability be equated to
n hours by a person at the y level of ability, and so on?
If we assume wide variations in inventive ability and disregard for
the moment the measurable resources involved in the educational
and material facilities required for producing untested inventions, in
order to measure the input in inventive activity—for the present in
nonmonetary terms—we would have to: (1) spot individuals who,
over a given period, engage in inventive activity;(2) ascertain the
hours spent on such activity; and (3) weight these hours by some scale
of inventive ability. Multiplying the hours by the appropriate weights
we could then say that so many equivalent man-hours of inventive
capacity have been "put-in" during the year.
The disparity between the data usually available and those sug-
gested above can easily be gleaned from the literature. In his illuminat-
ing article, "Inventors, Past and Present,"3 Jacob Schmookler pre-
sents findings for a small sample of persons to whom patents were
granted during four weeks in October and November 1953. These
findings are assembled with cross-section correlations of state data
on patents and number of "technologists" (treated as would-be in-
ventors), and defined in two ways: the narrower definition includes
electrical, mechanical, chemical, industrial, mining, and metallurgical
engineers, plus chemists, assayers, and metallurgists; the wider group
includes also civil engineers, architects, designers, draftsmen, the very
minor group of inventors proper, and surveyors. From our standpoint
two of the conclusions are of particular interest. First, even in recent
years, "invention remains primarily a part-time activity. Somewhat
Review of Economics and Statistics, August1957,pp. 321—333.
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less than half of all inventions are made by full-time inventors, the rest
being contributed by executives, line technologists, and individuals in
a wide variety of other occupations working in their spare time";
second, "about half of inventions patented are still being made by
individuals who lack college educations".4 Thus, even if we disre-
garded the question of the comparability of man-hours of individuals
endowed with different inventive capacities, and assumed that all
man-hours were equivalent (or allowed only for differences associated
with education, which apparently are not the most important), we
would still have no measure unless we could estimate the part-time
total of a large number of potential inventors.
But the problem of comparability is crucial, since it affects the whole
question of supply of inventors and inventive activity. The limits to the
possible supply obviously depend upon whether or not we assume a
wide spread of inventive ability and gradation among the successive
levels that would permit some quantitative comparison. Any light that
professional study of human capacities can shed on this question would
obviously be valuable. Moreover, we need far more empirical study
than we have had so far of the universe of inventors; any finding con-
cerning inventors, identified in either uniform or diverse fashion,
would be of great value—not only for the measurement of input but
also for public policy in regard to inventive activity. For the present,
the number of "technologists" can give us an inkling of the temporal
or spatial differences in input of man-hours of equivalent inventive
capacity onlyonthe assumptions that: (1) the proportion of technolo-
gists engaged in inventive activity and the average hours each devotes
to it are constant in time or equal in space; (2) the man-hours of non-
technologists are in constant proportion to the man-hours of tech-
nologists over time or the same in space; (3) either all man-hours are
equivalent, or the averageman-hourhas the same capacity weight for
both technologists and nontechnologists, and is constant over time or
the same in space. Clearly, these assumptions are unrealistic, although
one would be hard put to it to assess the degree of unrealism. Does the
average man-hour of nontechnologists have a lower weight as an
index of inventive capacity than that of technologists, and if so, how
much lower, and how has the coefficient changed over time? Has there
been a rise over time in the proportion of technologists engaged in
inventive activity? We do not have the answers to these questions, and
must guess at the qualifications that the acceptance of the above
ibid., p.329.
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assumptions impose on the use of the number of technologists as an
index of physical volume of input of inventive activity.
Even if we could establish a scale and measure man-hours of inven-
tive activity of equivalent capacity we would face the problem of
valuation. How do we value these man-hours for comparison with
other (material) resources employed in inventive activity and for com-
parison of the total with other inputs in the economy? Can we assume
that compensation paid by the market to hired inventors (full- or part-
time) or the revenue which the market secures to an independent
inventor reflects a yardstick similar to that used for other resources in
the economy? To be more specific, can we assume that the compensa-
tion of a hired inventor is determined by marginal productivity, with
the flow of supply such that the marginal cost of an additional unit will
not exceed or fall far short of the marginal return? Considering the
difficulty of estimating the economic contribution of inventive acti-
vity suggested in the preceding discussion of the magnitude of an
invention, the assumption of marginal productivity would surely
strain one's credulity. On the one hand, one may argue that, in the
aggregate, compensation to inventors, hired or independent, full-time
or part-time, is well below any reasonable estimate of the assignable
social product of their activity—partly because of the existence of non-
pecuniary rewards, and largely because of the narrowness of the private
market demand for many types of socially useful inventions. On the
other hand, one may argue that, in some industries in which inventive
activity is lavishly financed because of a general belief in a wide
technical change potential, aggregate wages paid to employed invent-
ors are too high (in comparison with other commodities and services)
because of the inability of firms to distinguish between the fertile
inventive mind and the educated hack. Since the market mechanism
can so easily fail, one may wonder whether an increase in the real
salaries of hired inventors actually means an increase in the input of
inventive activity. It does represent an addition to the volume of re-
sources devoted to sustain a particular group of people but it is no
assurance of any rise in the input of inventive activity measured on
some scale of inventive capacity.
This defect is inherent in the money measure of the input of any
factor that cannot be effectively appraised by the market in terms of
its quality or productivity. Obviously, it is a major deficiency of the
available series on research and development expenditures by corpora-
tions, governments, and universities. Postponing for the moment
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consideration of other qualifications of the series, I would like to stress
one implication of the argument above: that in dealing with the input
of inventive activity an attempt must be made to go behind the money
veil and to measure physical volume with allowance for quality
differentials. True, such an approach would lead into the difficult
field of inventive intelligence tests and personality studies and would,
at best, yield a quantitative measure of inventive capacity not com-
binable with the dollar values of reproducible resources so much
better evaluated by market prices. Such a measure would still be more
useful than dollar value totals which reveal little about the productive
factor involved. If, as is most likely, the supply of human talent is
the bottleneck in inventive activity, and if we can derive acceptable
measures of the input of this factor alone, we should eventually be
able to study the effect of differences in its input, in combination with
various amounts of material resources, on the output of inventions.
But to return to the series on research and development expendi-
tures (R and D), they obviously suffer from limitations other than the
inadequacy of the money yardstick in measuring the input of inventive
(the volume of inventive activity, as distinct from the volume
of its output). To begin with, they exclude individual and independent
inventors, whether full- or part-time; and in the light of Schmookler's
study, the omission is substantial. Then, they include expenditures
not only on applied research (which for practical purposes could be
considered a fairly close approximation to inventive activity), but also
on basic research (a small fraction of the reported total) and far more
important, on development work. Development expenditures are
probably far larger than expenditures on applied research proper,
particularly among business corporations (whose outlays dominate
the level and trend of R and D expenditures, including and excluding
government financing). The line of distinction, although difficult to
draw, is important: development expenditures begin when an inven-
tion, having been shown to "work," has been chosen for application
(provided the technical problems of adjustment, prototypes, pilot
operation, etc. permit extended operation, i.e., conversion of an in-
vention into an innovation). Such expenditures are likely to be large
because working out the patterns of operation, eliminating "bugs",
and making successive trials and removing errors are all time consum-
• ing and require a great deal of material capital and skilled resources.
I do not mean to disparage development work when I exclude it from
inventive activity; it certainly makes demands upon ingenuity, tech-
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nical knowledge, and ability. But it is a job of adjustment within given
patterns of the production process; it is not original invention. And
particularly important, the basis of decisions and the human personnel
involved in development work are quite different from those involved
in inventive activity. In studying this whole area of human endeavor,
we probably would benefit by keeping the two activities—inventions
or applied research, and development work—apart although naturally
both would have to be studied in covçring the full range from scien-
tific discovery to economic innovation and spread.5
On the basis of this distinction and the implied definition of inven-
tive activity (used throughout this paper), expenditures on applied
research or inventive activity are probably a limited fraction of total
R and D outlays. The actual fraction is a matter for guesswork, but
the available data on the high ratio of development invention costs in
those areas (aircraft, electronics, and the like) in which R and D ex-
penditure totals loom large, suggest a fraction that does not exceed
one-seventh.° If it is inventive activity that we wish to study, then we
should not dim our view of it by using measures that are incomplete
or so inclusive that inventive activity expenditures are only a small and
probably variable fraction of the total.7
Measures of Output
The problems in measuring output of inventive activity are similar
to those in measuring input: the difficulties of identification and of
valuation. But much more data, quantitative and qualitative, are
available on output than on input. The monographic and periodical
literature that records at least the important inventions in various
industries is far richer than that bearing directly upon activities,
The apparently opposite stand taken by Willis H. Shapley on the need for distinguish-
ing in the budgetary statistics between outlays on research and those on development
stems, as I read it, from a view similar to that presented here, that moneytotalsare a poor
measure of input of inventive activity or of applied research ability (see his "Problems of
Definition, Concept, and Interpretation of Research and Development Statistics," in
Methodology of Statistics on Research and Development, National Science Foundation,
59—36, Washington, 1959, particularly pp. 12—13).
°AfterI made the guess cited in the text, an estimate was published by Dexter M.
Keezer, Douglas Greenwald, and Robert P. Ulin, in their paper, "The Outlook for
Expenditures on Research and Development during the Next Decade," American
Economic Review, Papers and Proceedings, May 1960, pp. 355—369. The authors estimate
the share of applied research in total R and D expenditures at between 22 and 22.5 per
cent (see Table 3, p. 364).
I do not mean to underestimate the difficulty of making the distinction in statistical
collection. Nor are the observations above meant to minimize the high value of the new
data in what is essentially a very difficult field.
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characteristics, and origins of inventors and other information on
input. Moreover, we have long statistical series on patents for a num-
ber of countries as well as voluminous unpublished data in the files of
the national patent offices. Hence, instead of beginning with a further
specification of the difficulties of proper measurement of output—
which is perhaps unnecessary after our earlier discussion—we can
immediately consider the data available, and begin with the statistics
on patents.8
Before noting some of the limitations of the patent series, it would
be well to point out its advantages. A patent is presumably issued after
a test has been made of an invention's technical soundness, i.e.,
whether it matches the inventor's claim, and, in most countries, after
a search has revealed that a similar invention has not already been
patented. We may therefore assume—allowing for the fallibility of
any human process—that a patent represents a new and technically
feasible device. Furthermore, since it takes time and money to secure
a patent, its issuance is evidence that someone—either the inventor
or his backers—believes that the potential economic value of the
patent warrants the expenditure. To be sure the costs are not large and
some patents are taken out for their nuisance or blackmail value but
unless the proportion of such patents is large or variable, the quali-
fication they impose upon the statistics of patents as a count of new,
technically feasible devices with some potential economic value is
limited.
Note that these and subsequent comments refer primarily to patents
issued—not to patent applications. Although some time distortion is
introduced by the varying efficiency of the patent office into the series
of patents issued as compared with applications, it is the issuance of
a patent that assures a test of soundness and newness. Even that may
be upset by subsequent challenge ahd litigation, and perhaps the series
of patents issued net of upsets is the most unequivocal index of new
devices of potential economic value. But there is no need to dwell here
on technical details and on the possibilities of using one series as an
approximation to the other.
The impressive advantages of patent issues as a measure of output
of inventive activity, are offset by disadvantages under the heads of
both identification and valuation. First, not all inventions are patented.
8Thebest recent discussion of the patent data is that by Jacob Schmookler in an
unpublished paper, "A Critique of Patent Statistics and a Review of the Literature." I
have profited greatly from it, although I disagree at points with Schmookler's conclusions.
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Given the costs involved in securing a patent, the danger of competi-
tive imitation resulting from the compulsory revelation of the new
device, the cost of possible litigation in delending the patent, and the
ability of an enterprise originating or possessing the new device to
reap most of the benefit of pioneering without patent protection, the
number of inventions that are not patented may be large. It has been
suggested that the failure of the number of patents issued in this coun-
try to rise significantly since the 1920's may be due to an increasing
volume of inventions for which no patent is sought. This hypothesis
gains some support from the increasing proportion of patents assigned
to firms, which implies that a growing number of inventions are
originating under conditions in which a patent is not indispensable
(as it is to an independent inventor) to assure the economic benefits
to be derived. A contributory factor may be that many inventions are
originating with large firms (which have the dominant proportion of
private research departments) who fear that securing of patents may
expose them to accusations of violation of anti-trust regulations.
Another factor may be the growing financing of private research by
government. Also relevant may be the increasing extent to which
scientific discovery in some fields facilitates the development of alter-
native devices, so that patenting the pioneering device is no protection
against effective competition. Whatever the reasons, there probably
are variations in the extent to which the series of patents issued covers
all the new technically feasible and potentially profitable inventions.
It is also likely that the patent system in this country has become
increasingly deficient in coverage in recent decades.
But the main difficulty with patent statistics is, of course, the enorm-
ous range in the magnitude of the inventions covered. Obviously, we
cannot assume that one patented invention is, in any meaningful
economic sense, equivalent to another. It is in this economic sense, the
potential economic contribution of an invention, that we are naturally
interested. As already indicated, the potential economic contribution
of an invention when it is completed but before it has been tested and
applied on an adequate scale is a rather conjectural quantity, and it
would be difficult to attach such an estimate to each patent. Yet
patented inventions do differ widely in their potential economic mag-
nitude: a patent for a new corkscrew or plow sulky cannot be equated
with one for a new gas combustion engine (although the former may
eventually be economically more profitable, privately and socially,
than the latter). Even at present, with a restricted and selective use of
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the patent system and a greater proportion of patents assigned to
firms, one-third to four-tenths of all patented inventions do not reach
commercial use by the end of the fifth year after patent issuance—
a clear indication that for a substantial proportion of patents the im-
plicit claim of economic usefulness is not confirmed. Furthermore, the
range of economic contribution among patents that do find commer-
cial use is very likely wide. To be sure, an ex post facto judgment of
the economic potential of an invention in terms of its success in finding
commercial use and of its contribution when used assumes that the
economic contribution is properly determined by the play of market
forces. It implicitly assumes that business firms are on the lookout for
new inventions, appraise them tolerably well in terms of their potential,
and then allocate resources to their development so that the maximum
possible net contribution is realized. There may be flaws in this assump-
tion since no human institution works that rationally, but I see no
reasonable alternative to accepting it as a tolerable working rule—
with the necessary qualifications for monopolistic action, human
ignorance and folly, and for some inventions, the disparity between
private and social return.
If individual patented inventions differ widely in economic magni-
tude, would the average for a large sample be constant over time or of
approximately the same level across space? Would 1,000 patents, or
the total for a given year (and they have been averaging 40,000 per
year in this country in recent decades) have the same average economic
value as the total twenty or fifty years ago; the same in New York
state and in California; the same in this country and in the Nether-
lands? The answer cannot be given with assurance, but there are
grounds for saying "no". The marked shift since 1900 in the distribu-
tion of patents from those assigned to individuals to those assigned
to firms, the growing proportion of technologists among those securing
patents, and the indication of a rise in the proportion of patents
reaching commercial use all lead one to infer that there has been a
secular rise in the average economic potential of a patent over the
years, in this and perhaps in other countries. Other factors may have
offset this trend, especially the nonpatenting of inventions directly
exploitable by the originating firms, since it removes from the patent
statistics one group of economically significant inventions. But the
assumption that the raising and diminishing factors balanced each
other in the long run, let alone in the short, is unwarranted; and the
conclusion that the average economic magnitude per patent for any
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large group or the whole universe remained constant over time is
unjustified. Indeed, the secular trends in the average values may have
been quite marked. If so, it would be difficult to conceive that the
averages are the same in different areas, industries, or other aggregates:
each of these is a different compound of factors that produce trends
over time, and it is unlikely that the balancing of these factors would
produce equal average values. In short, one must conclude that the
easily available statistics on the number of patented inventions are in
units for which even the average economic value is variable—subject
to significant trends over time and significant differences in space.
But this does not mean that the data are arbitrary and worthless.
We need not assume that the trends over time and differences in space
in the average economic values are so large as to overwhelm the indica-
tion that patent statistics may provide of the collective judgment of
inventors and the resulting output differentials. To use an extreme
illustration: if one patent is issued in area A and one thousand in area
B, we could hardly conclude that the output of new inventions,
measured by their potential economic contribution, is not larger in
area B than in area A. Inventors are not complete ignoramuses and
their flocking to area B would reflect a higher appraisal of economic
potentialities there than in area A; and such flocking would include
inventors with different capacities, up to the highest. Consequently,
it would be dangerous to assume that the inventors in area B are idiots
whose output is outweighed by that lone genius in area A. This
reasoning may be completely wrong in any specific comparison, but
it probably is valid in the overwhelming proportion of cases. In any
event, it is presented here only as an example of the kind of assumption
one must make concerning the responses and judgments of inventors
as reflected in the patent statistics. The validity of the assumption
used clearly depends on the characteristics of inventors, for it is they
that determine the extent to which the collective judgment of inventors
can be relied upon for an appraisal of the economic potential. If this
collective judgment is not arbitrary but has some ascertainable rela-
tion to testable reality, it should be possible to interpret patent statis-
tics as meaningful indexes of the output of inventive activity—despite
the wide range in the economic contribution of individual patents or
variations in the averages for large groups. The studies by the few
scholars who have devoted attention to this material—Schmookler,
Stafford, Sanders, and others—indicate that the data are neither
arbitrary nor capricious, and that they can provide the basis for a
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great deal of insight into the distribution and even the volume of
invention output.9
Three other comments can be made in this discussion of patent
statistics. First, one can fairly say that even the easily available patent
statistics have not been studied adequately. Despite the illuminating
studies in this country by the scholars already mentioned and a hand-
ful of studies in other countries, I would conclude that the analysis has
lagged far behind the accumulation of data. Of course, such a lag
exists in practically every branch of empirical study of economic (and
I suspect of all social) phenomena. The typical conjunction of the
production of primary data by government and other agencies for
administrative or general social intelligence purposes with the scarcity
of scholarly analysts and of means at their disposal make a lag almost
inevitable. Yet, while no precise measure of this lag is at hand, my
impression is that it is much wider in the field under discussion, with
specific reference to patent statistics, than in the study of many other
production sectors in the economy. We are thus handicapped in
attempting an appraisal of the possible yield of patent statistics because
they have not been sufficiently analyzed.
Second, the mere number of patents, or even their classification by
industry or process (and we have little of the latter) is only a fraction
of the information in the files of the patent offices. At least in this
country (I am not familiar with the situation in others), each patented
device is described in some detail at the time of application and
issuance. I am not a technologist and cannot fully appraise the value
and potential uses of such information. But the latter is conceivably
raw material for a more intensive study of the output of inventive
activity than is possible on the basis of a mere count of patents or their
summary grouping into several classes. And, of course, these addi-
tional data would permit identification of the patentors, and provide
an initial step in the study of characteristics of inventors that is indis-
pensable for a better analysis of the supply side of inventive activity.
Finally, one may fully admit that the patent data, summary or
otherwise, are not a direct and efficient measure of the output of inven-
tive activity, whatever analytically oriented definition of the latter we
may agree upon. The relation is analogous to that between the primary
It would seem to me that the data are better indexes of output than of input. Their
defects as measures of output, i.e. of product of inventive activity, remain if they are
considered as measures of input, since input must record differences in capacity for
inventive activity. And they are a far more complete measure of output, since the input
that failed to produce a patentable invention is not included.
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dataand theprocesses or totals implied in the analytically oriented
definitions of many other areas of economic activity. The raw body of
statistics does not contain data on output of capital goods or even on
a clearly defined industrial sector, but we have been able to translate
it into some rough but meaningful approximation to the concepts
needed for analysis. The links connecting the original data with the
analytical concepts were found only by intensive attempts to use the
data. Some of the unexpected revelations that such studies provide
are of immense value in identifying these links or in revising the con-
cepts to render them operational without fatal loss of their analytical
clarity and usefulness. This is but an elaboration of the comment
above on the lag of analysis behind accumulation of patent data; but
it specifies the service that the reduction of the lag through further
study can make toward increasing the value of the data as measures
of output.
Related to and supporting this conclusion is the possibility of using
monographic and periodical literature (trade and industry journals,
files, etc.) for a study of inventions that have been applied and have
proved sufficiently important to deserve notice by historians and
analysts interested in the development of specific industries and pro-
ductive processes. These records register only a small proportion of the
thousands of patented inventions in any one industry: they omit the
host of inventions which are minor either in the technical or economic
sense. But they can yield a fairly acceptable list of inventions that have
proved important, with the possibility of distinguishing some order
of importance. Too few such attempts have been made to establish
a fully defensible basis of selection. But if the latter represents an
acceptable consensus of experts in the field, the resulting selection is
extremely useful, both for comparison with the yield of a study of all
patents in a given area and particularly as a basis for more intensive
analysis of successful inventions.
Concluding Comments
The gist of the discussion in this paper may be reduced to three pro-
positions.
1. Despite the overlapping among scientific research and discovery,
inventive activity, and design and development work, the attempt to
distinguish inventive activity would mean a sharper definition of focus
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and better research strategy. It would promise a more effective con-
centration of empirical data and analytical examination on the input
of a distinctive ability, and on the output of a distinctive product. Of
course, both the productivity of the input and the translation of the
output into economic production depend upon and are affected by
the other links in the chain from discovery to innovation. But granted
that the study of inventive activity, like that of any process that is
linked with others, can be useful only if there is a minimum parallel
effort made on the other links in the chain, this does not mean that it
is desirable to merge basic research, inventive activity, and develop-
ment into a fused mass and deal with the total input and output,
without an attempt to differentiate among the three.
2. Proper measurement of the input in inventive activity requires
some gauge of inventive capacity in addition to measures of repro-
ducible resources, whether invested in education or in material capital.
All these are needed, but the human ability resource is more crucial
than the material capital and the money value of education. Money
measures are of doubtful significance here. Disregarding the question
whether this is a proper field for economists (it obviously is not), there
is need, if relevant input measures are to be constructed, to draw upon
the study of specialized human abilities.
3. No efficient measures of the output of inventive activity are
available now. A variety of data—patent statistics, patent office files,
selected lists of inventions in monographic and periodical literature—
does exist but it has been barely utilized. According to preliminary
indications provided by studies already made, it can with further
work yield some quantitative indexes of the output of inventive acti-
vity—at least of rough trends and differences in the economic magni-
tude of new inventions in various fields at various times. The data are
incomplete, since unpatented inventions escape attention; but they
can yield far more information on trends and differences—to be linked
with scientific discovery at one end and innovations at the other—
than has been secured so far.
Judgments such as these can hardly be offered as firm conclusions.
Discussion of definitions, the purpose of which is to delimit a field of
inquiry through specifying its distinctive and constituent character-
istics, can lead to no more than judgments whose relevance can be
tested only by the development of research in the field. Likewise, dis-
cussion of problems of measurement can,, unless much quantitative
work in the field has already been done, lead only to suggestions that
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still have to stand the test of prolonged experimentation with the link-
ages between the available data and the desired quantitative counter-
parts of analytically defined concepts. The field under consideration
has not reached the state of development in which canons of definition
and measurement can be derived as conclusions distilled from already
accumulated experience. Under the circumstances, all the proposi-
tions above can be advanced only as subjects for critical examination
and debate; but more usefully as threads in the search for guidelines
for further substantive research in the field.
COMMENT
JACOB SCHMOOKLER, University of Minnesota
When the other papers are considered against the background of
Simon Kuznets' contribution, it seems clear that in many respects the
conference is concerned not only with inventive activity as Kuznets
defines it but with other kinds of knowledge-producing activity as well.
The full range of activities covered can be delineated as follows.
1. APPLIED SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH. This may be defined as a planned
search for new knowledge which is expected to have a practical pay-off.
This term is intended to cover both basic research in industry and
applied research as defined by the National Science Foundation. The
NSF defines applied research as "Research projects which represent
investigations directed to discovery of new scientific knowledge and
which have specific commercial objectives with respect to either pro-
ducts or processes." It defines basic or fundamental research (in in-
dustry) as "Research projects which represent original investigation
for the advancement of scientific knowledge and which do not have
specific commercial objectives, although they may be in fields of
present or potential interest to the reporting company."2 The reason
for here including basic research in industry in the category of applied
research is simply that such research is ordinarily expected to have an
industrial application, though its precise character is not foreseen.
Otherwise, firms would be unlikely to spend money on it.
NOTE: The author wishes to express his indebtedness to 0. H. Brownlee for his criti-
cisms of an earlier version of these comments.
1Science and Engineering in American Industry: Report on a 1956 Survey, National
Science Foundation 59—50, Washington, 1959, p. 95.
2Ibid.
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2. DEVELOPMENT.Thismay be defined as technical activity con-
cerned with the nonroutine problems encountered in creating or im-
proving industrial products or processes.3
In short, applied research is the search for new knowledge about
natural or industrial products or processes with the expectation that
the knowledge gained will be useful. Development is the effort ex-
pended in creating or improving industrial products or processes. The
latter may or may not be based on knowledge gained in the former.
As used here, applied research is concerned with the discovery,
development, and creation of economically useful knowledge. The
two adtivities combined represent the sum total of society's tech-
nology fostering efforts. "Pure research" stands apart from both,
in that its primary purpose is the acquisition of knowledge for its
own sake.
What is "inventive activity" and where does it fit in to this frame-
work? We can define the term broadly and include all effort, from the
initial exploratory work into the nature of phenomena carried on in
the expectation that some use for the knowledge gained will result,
to the formulation of the central properties of a new or improved
product or process and the reduction of the idea to a form suitable
for routine use in production. In that case, inventive activity is coex-
tensive with applied research and development as defined above.
Alternatively, we can so define it as to include only (a) the formula-
tion of the central properties of the idea, and (b) its reduction to the
point where it works, whether or not it works efficiently. The latter is
essentially the definition which Kuznets proposes, and it corresponds
substantially with the effort required to produce a patentable inven-
tion.
I shall use the second, Kuznetsian, definition on the ground that the
character of such effort, certainly historically and probably currently
as well, differs in many important ways, as Kuznets argues, from that
involved in scientific discovery on the one hand or engineering develop-
ment on the other. However, while Kuznets believes that inventive
activity in this more restricted sense corresponds to that designated
by the NSF as applied research, 1 gather from a conversation with
The NSF defines development as "Technical activity concerned with nonroutine
problems encountered intranslating research findings or other general scientific
knowledge into products or processes," Ibid.Thisdefinition unfortunately involves the
unwarranted assumption that new or improved products invariably emerge from a prior
scientific base.
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Jacob Penman, Head of the Office of Special Studies, that the problem
is not simple. According to Penman, inventions in patentable form
generally come from the development phase, while the central ideas
come from applied research. in my opiniol, however, if the respond-
ents to the NSF questionnaires follow the NSF definitions religiously,
only activity expended on scientific discovery takes place in applied
research and all invention takes place in development. Be that as it
may, if research discovers what exists but was not known, while
development creates what did not exist before, then invention is a
phase of development. Separating research from invention is analyti-
cally useful, although in practice the two activities are often insepar-
able, so that the distinction is in one sense artificial.
Development as defined both here and by the NSF yields many
minor and unpatentable improvements as well—improvements which
I would call subinventions. Thus, the NSF definition of the activity
includes "engineering activity required to advance the design of a
product or a process to the point where it meets specific functional and
economic requirements and can be turned over to manufacturing
units. The design, construction, and testing of pre-production proto-
types and models and 'engineering follow-through' in the early pro-
duction phase is included. The development of designs for special
manufacturing equipment and tools is included..
.Ittherefore
seems clear that while the problems dealt with in development are
nonroutine, their solution often does not demand the creative faculty
which the term invention implies. Whereas invention implies a result
beyond that obvious to one skilled in the art, much development
clearly does not.
To be sure, the degree of novelty required to constitute invention is
open to dispute. To an outsider the paper bags, railroad rails, hayforks,
etc., on which thousands of patents have been issued, might seem mere
subinventions, and hardly inventions at all. Perhaps only those who
have tried to make significant improvements in existing products or
processes, or tried to produce nonroutine advances in any field of re-
search, are likely to accept as proper the standard of novelty of the
Patent Office.
Institutionally, invention is an activity engaged in by independent
individuals, by corporations, and by governments. The objective is the
improvement or creation of a specific product or process. The work
requires examining the existing literature on the subject, theorizing,
ibid., p.98.
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experimenting, formulating the essential properties of the new product
or process, working it through to operational form so that subinven-
tion can take over, washing out the test tubes, and sweeping up the
floor.
Standing in a partially overlapping category are the applied research
programs of industry and the production-oriented, knowledge-creating
activities of nonprofit institutions. These two, of course, might be
classified in separate categories. They are joined here only because
both are production oriented, and are distinguished from develop-
ment in that, while they are intended to improve production, the result-
ing knowledge usually must be further "processed" before that objec-
tive is achieved. Applied research in industry and production-oriented
nonprofit research typically aim at illuminating whole classes of
natural or industrial phenomena, not a single, specific commercial
product or process. Thus, the scientific discovery that diabetes can be
controlled by injection of insulin extracted from the normal pancreas
of animals had to be followed by the invention and other development
of means of producing insulin industrially. Similarly, as Nelson
points out in his paper, scientific discoveries in solid-state physics had
to be followed by development before the new knowledge could be
put to industrial use. By definition, applied research includes research
in engineering, soil science, aerodynamics, pharmacology, medicine,
etc., in nonprofit institutions. Moreover, even nonprofit work in basic
science motivated primarily by the prospective economic or military
utility of the result should likewise be included.
The relevant distinction is notbetweenbasic and applied, but be-
tween pure and applied research. The results of basic research pre-
sumably illuminate an aspect of nature, the understanding of which
is fundamental to some branch of knowledge. When undertaken with
this objective as primary, it may properly be called pure research.
However, if, as with most contemporary viral or nuclear research,
the sponsors (if not the researchers) pursue the research with potential
economic or military uses uppermost in mind, it is applied, not pure,
research. Moreover, not all pure research is or is expected to be basic.
A census of butterflies in a region would be surely pure but not neces-
sarily basic research, for example.
The distinction between invention, other development, and applied
research on the one hand, and pure research on the other is important
to make, at least if one is interested in the theory of economic develop-
ment. Sometimes, more out of convenience than conviction, modern
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economists have treated the growth of knowledge as autonomous. Yet,
only a modest understanding of the phenomenon is needed to show
that this assumption is at least partly false. Just as our knowledge of
mineral deposits under the surface of the earth has been built up
largely because of the possibilities of economic exploitation, so too,
much of our knowledge of science and technology has been developed
with a similar objective in view. Hence, the distinction between pure
research on the one hand and other. knowledge-producing activities
on the other corresponds to the distinction which students of economic
development draw between exogenous and endogenous variables, and
pure research is a relevant exogenous variable to the degree that the
resulting findings prove sooner or later to affect the direction and rate
of economic growth.
The volume and location of these activities inevitably is influenced
by the role of economic objectives and the product- or process-
specificity of the expected results. Pure research, because of the absence
of an applied objective, derives its support almost entirely from, and
takes place entirely in, nonprofit institutions. By contrast, invention
and other development take place almost entirely under the auspices
of the presumptive principal immediate beneficiary, because the re-
suits take the form of specific products or processes, and are therefore
in considerable measure appropriable directly by the sponsoring
agent.
In contrast to development, the output of applied research, whether
in the form of theories or data about natural or industrial processes and
materials, is usually not product- or process-specific. This difference in
specificity of results is associated with corresponding differences in
their appropriability, which in turn helps explain the larger share of
nonprofit institutions and trade association research organizations in
the conduct of applied research.
Before we turn to a consideration of measurement problems, one
final comment seems appropriate. The inherent uncertainty of each
activity often takes the form of the attainment of unplanned results.
In invention, a project designed to improve, say, automobile engines
may yield as its major result a new metal alloy, an improved fuel, or a
scientific discovery. Likewise, what was initially a project in basic
science may produce instead a new invention, e.g. a cyclotron. The
situation, again, is analogous to mineral exploration. Someone pros-
pecting for gold may find iron or nothing; and vice versa, someone
searching for iron or nothing may find gold. The discrepancy between
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ex ante and ex post is thus very great in knowledge-producing activities,
and it is one that students of the growth of knowledge must bear in
mind.
Let me turn next to the measurement of output. I shall confine my
remarks to the economic value. When we assign an economic value to
an invention, it is its value after (not before) full development that is
involved. I shall therefore treat invention and other development as
one for the purpose of discussion. In short, I am discussing the value
of the invention in the form in which it is actually used or produced
by in4ustry.
As Kuznets and Machiup have shown in principle, and Griliches in
practice, we can estimate the social value of an invention. Moreover,
if we wished we could estimate what its value would have been if differ-
ent conditions prevailed. Of course, for some purposes (e.g., a com-
parison of two inventions far apart in time or space), it is not its
absolute value which is relevant but its percentage effect on output,
cost, or per capita income. If we can estimate the value of a single
invention, I think we can, in principle at least, do likewise for a whole
stream. The practical difficulties, however, are another story.
By contrast, there may be a theoretical reason why we could not
ordinarily estimate the value of any other kind of knowledge and this
reason applies, incidentally, to any comparable effort to assign a value
to what Kuznets calls "the technical potential" of a given invention.
The economic value of other kinds of knowledge derives, so far as I
can tell, entirely from their contribution to specific inventions. The
reason we may be unable to estimate the value of knowledge other
than inventions is that each item of knowledge is by definition unique.
Now, inventions are largely new combinations of existing knowledge.
Hence, in many if not most cases, an item of knowledge entering into
the making of an invention is indispensable to its creation. Without
it, the specific invention would be impossible.
With each ingredient of an invention unique, it may be as impossible
to assign a specific value to a single item within the particular complex
of knowledge constituting the invention, as it is to assign a specific
value to the wing of an airplane in flight. We could say that the value
of the single item of knowledge in this particular combination does
not exceed the value of the invention itself, but this is a different and
not very useful thing.
One implication of this, which has long been recognized and in a
sense eloquently pointed out by Ogburn and Gilfihlan, is that the value
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of a given invention reflects not only the resources expended directly
in its production but also the resources expended in producing the
prior knowledge on which it is based. Hence, just as many American
inventions rest on basic European discoveries and inventions, so it is
possible that the intellectual effort of a given period may deserve far
more credit than its direct output of inventions would suggest.
Now, despite the fact that we cannot place a value on individual
items of knowledge other than inventions, it would still be very useful
to study the frequency with which particular inventions or other
pieces of knowledge reappear in a different guise in the course of tech-
nological progress. Kuznets is quite right in emphasizing the different
technical potentials, the varying seminal quality, of different inven-
tions. I am onl.y emphasizing that other knowledge possesses an
identical quality, and that while this quality merits study, it will elude
measurement.
On the other hand, a private firm would certainly want to estimate
the value to it of the new knowledge it generates. In this case, the appro-
priate thing for it to do is, presumably, to estimate the value to it of
the inventions it makes, and assign this sum either to its R and D
program as a whole, or to those phases of the program which fed the
particular inventions. It might conceivably even form some crude
estimate of the value of the inventions yet to come from the research
the company has already performed. The limited time span and the
narrow confines of the operation make these more sensible under-
takings for a firm than for society. It is all the more reasonable for the
firm, since it does not have to assign any value to the knowledge it uses
from the public domain.
Let me turn now to a few brief remarks about the measurement of
input. Kuznets is, of course, entirely right in emphasizing the desir-
ability of nonmonetary measures here, What one would like would be
estimates of the physical and human inputs used, each in some relevant,
homogeneous unit. From such estimates one might want to construct
estimates of the invention production function.
Unfortunately, unlike other production functions (except those for
other knowledge-producing activities, such as market research or
mineral exploration), every act of production here may change the
production function itself. All production functions assume a given
state of knowledge. The purpose of the inputs in this case, however, is
to change the state of knowledge. Hence, successive acts of production
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may occur under unique production functions. Moreover, different
projects at the same time operate under different production functions
for a similar reason.
But even if we are interested only in the inputs independently of the
production function, we still have the problem of the heterogeneity
of inputs conventionally called by the same name. The occupations
involved in invention and research are far more heterogeneous than
are occupations in most fields. It is a tolerable approximation to re-
gard one unskilled laborer as the equivalent of another, but it is hardly
tolerable to view engineers or scientists in this fashion. And the median
chemical engineer of 1950 is hardly comparable with the median
chemical engineer of 1900. Perhaps most important of all, men differ
vastly in terms of their creative talent, their possession and use of the
"inventive faculty." While I would like to see, with as much refinement
as possible, data on physical and human inputs, we may have to
settle for careful estimates of expenditure on inputs. Such estimates
at least indicate the share of national product devoted to increasing
technical knowledge.
This problem of the heterogeneity of input probably reaches its
most acute form, as indicated above, in the case of the inventive faculty
itself. What we would like, while we are writing out our Christmas list,
is a measure of this faculty in psychological terms, since the pheno-
menon involved is essentially psychological. I would assume that
psychologists can or will ultimately be able to isolate the inventive
faculty in its various forms, and that they can or will be able to rank
those who possess any particular form of the faculty according to the
degree to which they have it. Such information would be of great value
to educators, employers, and—if it were available for large groups or
over extended periods of time for representative samples—to students
of economic growth.
On the other hand, such data will be of more limited use than one
would like. For example, we would have difficulty inferring from the
inventive faculty of an individual as shown by a test score how much
of that faculty he exercised in making a given invention, since the use
of a capacity may be less than the capacity itself.
What is worse, I do not think, from my limited reading on the sub-
ject, that we could rank all the inventors operating in a given period
according to their inventiveness, because different fields of invention
appear to demand different kinds of psychological abilities as well as
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different kinds of training.5 The result is that Mr. X can make inven-
tion A but not invention B, while Mr. Y can make invention B but
not invention A.
Worst of all, even if none of these problems existed, I do not believe
that we could add together the psychological inventiveness test scores
of the different inventors of a period and get a meaningful total—for
the same reason that four men each with an I.Q. of 75 are not, in com-
bination, twice as intelligent as one man with an I.Q. of 150. The
differences among them are ordinal, not cardinal.
I am therefore forced to the reluctant conclusion that our interest in
the distribution of the inventive faculty can be served only by studies
like MacKinnon's of the psychological attributes of actual and poten-
tial inventors, and by studies of the factors which affect their develop-
ment and functioning.
Let me summarize what I have tried to say. The conference is con-
cerned with knowledge-producing activities of different kinds. Four
broad categories may be distinguished: applied research, development,
invention which is part of development, and pure research. Each of
these provides knowledge inputs for the others and for itself. The
differences among them run in terms of closeness to economic use,
economic versus noneconomic motivation, and the degree of novelty
(invention versus other development). The institutional differences and
the extent of support accorded each activity largely reflect the differing
appropriability of the results.
In principle and in practice we can and should try to get the best
measures we can of the physical, human, and money cost of research
and invention. We can likewise try to estimate the social returns from
specific inventions. On the other hand, while we can study the inven-
tive faculty in various ways with valuable results, one of those results
will not be, in my judgment, an aggregate index of inventiveness,
potentially or actually used, either for an industry or for the economy.
Similarly, I do not see how we could assess the social value of that
portion of knowledge which takes forms other than specific inventions.
Cf. H. Stafford Hatfield, who argues that the psychological attributes needed for
successful invention are different in inorganic chemistry from those demanded in organic
chemistry. Hatfield, TheInventorand His World, New York, Penguin Books, 1948, p. 131.
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